Sunday, 18 August 2013

“IS IT WRONG TO BE A LEADER?”

      I still remember what my management guru said to differentiate between a Boss and a Leader “The Boss says do the Job…. While a Leader says let’s do the Job”. The difference is not grammar but it conveys a whole lot of things, the group dynamics and efficiency of work. Army leadership is good example to differentiate the two. But sadly over the days leaders with mettle have become a rare commodity, just as to find a needle in a stack of Hay. A leader has to always lead from the front and bear the brunt from bullets to the barb of backbites.

     Coming to the present situation where India is facing a severe threat from both internal and external elements. It has become a testing time for the Military leadership to prove their mettle. There was a strong argument from some quarter of the society that the present Military leadership in Army Headquarters is weak, follows the policy of Govt, non-aggressive and indecisive. Sometimes one feels they are correct because of lack of availability of factual information. Can one really say that Indian Army is not retaliating? See our opponent’s media they are full with Anti India news? Is there some truth in what they say? These are few questions when asked we would realize the actual stance of our leadership today.


  Present Army Chief, who has been always at the forefront in every battlezone, visits each and every location from most inhospitable terrain of Uttarakhand to the LoC, to make his presence felt. Due to his clear guidelines and instructions more than a dozen operations were conducted eliminating many hard core terrorists.  He always pulled up his commanders whenever he found some flows.  But the Irony is that his activity of being a Leader, giving clear instructions to the military commanders is being questioned by some corners of the society. My Questions to you all is “Is it wrong to be a leader?  Would you like an armchair General or a Robust, forthright General? ”

Saturday, 17 August 2013

NATIONAL SECURITY & THE TWITTER CHIRP

 Coming back to following news after a long absence from the internet gives one a perspective of how talk is cheap & tweets are cheaper. The generation of thinkers & writers today have instilled a feeling of bliss in the populace that mere writing, or even less, just tweeting about events means that one has done their bit.

As a pillar of democracy, our defence forces are as strong as our democracy & vice versa. Approach towards the complex conditions of our ‘in-security scenario’ by just copying aspects from foreign countries, is in no way going to lead us to a sustainable strategic supremacy.

 Recent news coverage of cease fire violations & border transgressions do play on the patriot minds where one thinks that are we weak? Or are we weak hearted? It’s difficult to appreciate our armed forces, which not only have the advantage of numbers but also the backing of a large defence budget to be weak. Balance, weak hearted is more a matter of situation than belief.

We all compare our structured society as the template everywhere. It may not be true in case of our neighbours. In Pakistan, there is the Government, the Military & the Religious Groups. Each holds a significant stake in the power cauldron. Our unified front has a triad to engage; diplomatically, militarily & fundamentally. Yet, while we may choose our friends, we cannot choose our geographical neighbours. The entire business of engagement thus runs on fluid rules with a continuous SWOT overhang.

Chanakya mentions a requirement of 1:10, in levels of resource supremacy, to definitively defeat an adversary. As an economy, a military & a society, that ratio is missed when we compare ourselves with Pakistan. So expecting a subdued response from the other side is not simple, let alone fair. Even if we try beyond, patriotic & emotional victories so not appear worthwhile. We have not much to gain; they have not much to lose. Till this status does not change, It is what It is.

Being election season, discussing politics will only lead us to ideological dead ends. So let us look at the borders. The rustic, simple & dependable Indian soldier always gives me a faith of security. Incidents like the 6th August killings on the LoC, though need deep introspect by national and military leadership, appears more as a reminder, that we still have a long way to evolve. The Army Chief visited the area. His orders were clear: Befitting Response. While a tiger just sniffs away flies that fly around its face, it kills any animal of a bigger size if threatened. Hence, ‘Befitting’.

Today, our perception is dictated by a bunch of people shouting their opinion on the 9 pm TV. The truth is, they are getting air-time and we are being short changed. In our democracy, while things are not bright. The business of insecurity and its proliferation is not helping our cause. I might not trust the preaching politics but I am sure of our bravest of brave, who don’t preach but ‘do’, for giving us the ‘free’ in freedom. Jai Hind!

Monday, 15 July 2013

7th Pay Commission for Central Government Employees

The VI Central Pay Commission has come and gone and now the Central Govt Employees are looking forward to the VII CPC.  In most likely scenario, the Commission to foresee and prepare the VII CPC will be appointed by the Government before going to the Polls in 2014.  This Commission in all probability will be chaired by a retired Judge of Supreme Court.

The Government employees are surfing the net in search of any news of the 7th Pay Commission.  It has to be mentioned here that any news available on the net are false and misleading.  Please bear in mind that nobody has the authority or expertise to foresee what the pay commission will formally grant to the Central Government employees.  Therefore any such news given on the net is false and based on pure hypothesis.

Many of employees have a single question, will the 7th CPC be implemented?  The answer for that is Yes, why because the Pay Commissions are implemented by an ordinance of the Government of India and as per the present laws, it is imperative on the ruling Government, whosoever is in power to formulate the Pay structure of the Central Government employees including the Defence and the Railways every 10 Years

To understand the implementation of any pay commission, we have to understand the politics of India.  The civilian employees constitute 35 lakhs voters in electoral rolls, add to this another 70 lakhs plus from the defence and railways. No political party has the will and the wherewithal to overlook such kind of numbers of future voters.  

Announcing a commission for pay is imperative on the ruling Government, the implementation of the the commissions report is not!  The implementation of Pay commission is usually done in co-ordination by the Finance Ministry, the Law Ministry. the Human Resources Development Ministry and the DOPT.  The previous two pay commissions were implemented when the ruling Government looked like loosing the majority in the house of the Parliament.  In 1998 when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's NDA was in serious threat of loosing majority and polls loomed large, the NDA announced the Vth CPC.  Similarly when the general elections were due in 2008 and the UPA I was going to the polls with shaky majority, the VIth CPC was announced.

If you study the trend, a commission for pay related matters of Central Government is generally constituted 2 years before the actual date of implementation.  The previous pay commission was set up by the Government in October 2006, under the chairmanship of Justice B.N.Srikrishna with a time limit of 18 months.  It was implemented on 24th March 2008.  Similarly the 5th CPC was constituted in 1994 under the chairmanship of Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian and it was implemented in October 1997 and the elections were held in September, 1999. 

If you look carefully at the past history of Pay commission, you will find some co-relation between the general elections and the pay commission.  The General Elections were due in April 2009 and for 6 months prior to that, any government can't issue any changes in policy matters due to Code of Conduct.  So, the UPA I Government decided to implement it in March 2008.  

This brings me to deduce that the 7th CPC may be constituted by the present UPA-II Government before the 2014 General Elections.  The implementation will however be a question for the future government in place in 2016.

Why are the 7th Pay Scales reported on the net false :

The Pay commission arrives on a pay structure by adding your (basic + interim relief + grade pay) X the fitment benefit which the Cabinet approves.  The fitment benefit for VI CPC was 1.86 % (Justice Srikrishna had proposed a fixation benefit of 1.74 but the Government increased it to 1.86).  

So simply put the revised pay for VII CPC will be whatever your basic will be on 1.1.2016 + the grade pay + DA you get X the fixation benefit.  However I expect the fitment benefit to be from 2 to 2.20 based on the past record of pay commissions not 3% as the websites are referring to. 

So don't be mislead by any site on the web which give you any pay scales.  No site has any authority to pronounce the rates however beautifully or imaginatively the website may be named.  I know it sounds pretty cool to learn that you will be getting 30K+ basic in the next Pay Commission  as opposed to the 10K+ basic you are getting now, but expectation can only disappoint you.  And remember the VII pay commission will be announced no matter what anybody says. The dates may be obscure but the implementation is certain

Friday, 21 June 2013

DOES INDIA REQUIRE A GENERAL NO 1

DOES INDIA REQUIRE A GENERAL NO 1

 Gallipoli, during the First World War, when General Sir Ian Hamilton, commanding the Royal Army, desperately wanted Naval gun fire support but this was not available as the Admiral commanding the Fleet had ordered his warships to clean their boilers. The Gallipoli disaster taught the British the need for ensuring proper coordination between the Services in battle. The need for this got further underscored with the emergence of the Air Force as a major partner in battle, whether on land or at sea. There was need for close professional co-ordination between the three Defence Services.

After the First World War, the British introduced a Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), comprising the three Service Chiefs in their Defence High Command. This arrangement was also adopted by other countries. During the Second World War, the concept of a Supreme Commander in all theatres of war was evolved. Within a few years after that War, the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was made at the national level in all countries, except India. Some countries use different nomenclature for this appointment but the functions assigned are the same.

Higher Defence Organization as per records flourished during the reign of Chandragupta Maurya. Megasthenes, the Greek Ambassador in Chandragupta’s court brought out in his Book “Indika”, that the Mauryan War Office in the fourth century BC was a combined headquarters for both the Army and the Navy. The Mauryan War Office functioning under the Commander-in-Chief had six boards, each of five officers. These were Infantry, Cavalry, Elephants, Chariots, Admiralty and Commissariat. The War Office administered a standing Army of 600,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 9,000 elephants and 8,000 chariots plus an unspecified number of warships.

The Mauryan Empire extended from Kashmir to Karnataka and Kamarup to Kabul. During the British era, India was perhaps the only country in the world which had a single Commander-in-Chief for all the three Services.

In 1947, this arrangement was discarded and each Service came to have its own Commander-in-Chief, independent of each other. The nomenclature of the three Chiefs was changed in 1955 from Commanders-in-Chief to Chiefs of Staff. This re-designation has been both meaningless and misleading.  In our set up, the Chiefs of Staff are not part of the Ministry. They are not authorized to take any decision on behalf of the Government nor issue any Government orders. These functions are performed by civil officials in the MoD. The Service Chiefs continue to function as Commanders-in-Chief of their Service. Thus, it is a misnomer to call our Service Chiefs, Chiefs of Staff.

After the Kargil War a Task Force under Arun Singh, a former Minister of State in the Defence Ministry, was set up to examine India’s higher defence organization. The recommendations of the Task Force on the Management of Defence were accepted by the Group of Ministers,  As per that the Services Headquarters were integrated  with MoD and even re-designated the three SHQs as Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence(Army/ Navy/Air Force). However authority in regard to subjects of little consequence, have been delegated to Service Headquarters for integrated functioning but all issues of any consequence are dealt with by the civil officials of MoD. In other words the old arrangement of the civilian bureaucracy exercising authority without expertise or responsibility has continued. Even the suggestion that civil servants in Ministry of Defence should be from the Indian Foreign Service rather than Indian Administrative Service has not been accepted. Defence Policy and Foreign Policy being two sides of the same coin, an officer from IFS is far better suited to serve in Ministry of Defence than an IAS officer.

As far as CDS was concerned, a similar attempt has been made to derail the recommendation of the Task Force, accepted by the Group of Ministers and approved by the Cabinet. A large headless Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) has been provided which serves little purpose. Without a CDS, the required professional co-ordination and unified approach will lack.   Some of the reasons for strong opposition of the post of CDS are

1.      The political leadership’s fear, of the man on the horse back. It is apprehended that the Defence Services will become too powerful and subvert civilian control over the military, a military coup will occur.

2.      The opposition of the civilian bureaucracy to any arrangement in which their dominance and stranglehold over the higher defence set up is diminished.

3.      The feeling among the smaller Services, particularly the Air Force, of Army dominance in defence policy formulation. Some fear that a CDS lead to a situation like the one that prevailed before 1947, when the Army was the dominant Service.

4.      The inhibitions of serving Service Chiefs that their position would get undermined if the CDS were to be appointed.

But however the fear that a CDS will erode the supremacy of the bureaucracy over the military is proved wrong as the CDS will not be a Supreme Commander. He will only be an Inter-Service professional coordinator with individual Service Chiefs having the right of direct access to the Head of the Government. It also needs to be mentioned that Army Chiefs in different countries have staged military coups but no CDS has ever done so. India’s Defence Services are fully committed to upholding democratic values and in a well established democracy like ours with such diversity, and of continental dimension, the question of a military coup does not arise. In the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff, his functions are virtually being performed, less efficiently by other functionaries.


Thus it is high time we in India introduce this appointment and also in due course have integrated field commands. This is imperative for efficient, economical and effective functioning of our higher defence organization in both peace and war. National interests should not be allowed to be held hostage to vested interests

Thursday, 13 June 2013

Is BCCI a Board of Cunning and Corrupt India

Indian Media after a month long, relentless, almost breathless campaign against the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) and its corrupt ways has been forced to look like fools. The richest sports body in the country, indeed among the richest in the world, has shown everyone who's the boss.

It has so disdainfully brushed aside every clamour for cleansing its act that one wonders if they even care about the fans that have made the game most popular sport in the country. And more importantly, do they really care about making it a sport and not a betting mafia in the garb of a sports body?

      I really can’t understand, what does the board president meant by stepping aside? His own son-in-law has been caught with his hand in the till. Even after dire attempts to claim that his son-in-law was neither the owner nor the principal of the team that the board’s president owns, the man travelled with the team, indeed entered the dugouts, as an enthusiast. Wow! So he is trying to say any enthusiast can do that… Is it?

        We are not even discussing here the conflict of interest where the board’s team captain is also the captain of the IPL franchisee he owns, and is even a honcho of the company he owns. Is it any surprise that when a selector as illustrious as Mohinder Amarnath, who was the man of the match in both the World Cup 1983 semi-final and final, demanded that this skipper be sacked after a disastrous tour of Australia in 2011-12, the board president actually showed Amarnath the door. This explains why the rest of the board members were so impotent, or at least acted so, that they did not have the guts to call a spade a spade and ask the man to just go?

         One feels sad for the cricket lovers of this country who have made the game as popular and bankable as any marketer can dream of. Look at the way the board treats them. Ever gone to witness a cricket game, be it an international or an IPL? It is the paying public that is pushed and shoved around the most. From entering the stadium to watching the game to exiting at the end of the game, it is they who are treated like cattle, while the VVIPs and freeloaders are ushered in and all facilities are made available to make them enjoy their stay at the venue.

        The richest cricket board in the world, which often misuses its financial clout to ride roughshod over other cricket boards, is blissfully unaware, or deliberately unaware. It continues to treat all those who matter with disdain, and even the players, as the team’s captain shows, are mere pawns. Cricketers like Dhoni and Tendulkar or anyone are big only in the eyes of the masses, for the administrators of this game, they are puppets.

        Sadly for them, thanks to the media’s relentless pressure, the paying public is now seeing through this. There is more chatter on how mismanaged the show is than ever before, and even though the IPL final boasted of a houseful despite the controversy, the board should know that the veneer of concern for the game is now very very thin. If the current enquiry and all else is shown to be an eyewash, as it is likely to be, the same public that is the reason for their clout will bring them down. This is very clearly seen in the TRPs of the present Champions Trophy matches in UK.


Sunday, 2 June 2013

Naxalism....


25 May 13, a black Saturday in the history of Congress party of Chhattisgarh, The entire top party leadership was wiped out. The party made a hue and cry, it called for a state Bandh and many leaders pledged to put an end to the Naxal menace. 28 people killed in the deadly attack by the Naxals at Jagdalpur, which included Congress leadership and CRPF personnel.

Who are these Maoists? Mostly these Maoist/Naxal groups function under the umbrella organization Communist Party of India (Maoist) that has been banned by the Home Ministry of India as the 34th terrorist organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. These Maoists organizations/groups have been found to be working as ‘partners’ at various times and locations with SIMI,ULFA, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harkatul Mujahideen, Al Badr, Jamat-ul-Mujahid and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).
 
The Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist) has published a secret red book 'Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution', which is said to be the Naxals' Bible. Talking about supporting anti-national movements the book says: “Lakhs of enemy's armed troops have been deployed since long in J&K and the north-eastern States. More and more nationalities may come into armed confrontation with the reactionary Indian State, so it will be difficult for the Indian ruling classes to mobilise all their armed forces against our revolutionary war.”

The ‘Red Corridor’ runs through the dense forest and tribal belt, from Nepal through Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and all the way to Andhra Pradesh and to the upper reaches of Maharashtra, and some parts of Karnataka. Inside their corridor, the Naxalites run a parallel government and vow to continue their fight against the state—a full-fledged war they call ‘people’s struggle’. 

All the Left-wing militant organisations, including the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the People’s War Group (PWG), after their merger are now operating under the flagship rebel party—CPI (Maoist).

The Central intelligence reports have also issued a warning that the Maoists are now in the process of identifying ‘new operational areas’ across the country. They are keenly looking at industrial belts, where big corporate houses are planning to set up the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), an easy target to launch violent agitation. 

The Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist) has published a secret red book ‘Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution’, which is said to be the Naxals’ Bible. The book says: “The central task of the revolution is seizure of political power through protracted People’s war.” Talking about supporting sub-national movements in India, the book says: “Lakhs of enemy’s armed troops have been deployed since long in J&K and the north-eastern States. More and more nationalities may come into armed confrontation with the reactionary Indian State, so it will be difficult for the Indian ruling classes to mobilise all their armed forces against our revolutionary war.” It further says the urban areas are one of the main sources which provide cadre and leadership having various types of capabilities essential for People’s war.

Birth of Naxalism

In the backdrop of organizational upheavals within the Indian Communist movement, an incident in a remote area transformed the history of left-wing extremism in India. In a remote village called Naxalbari in West Bengal, a tribal youth named Bimal Kissan, having obtained a judicial order, went to plough his land on March 2, 1967. The local landlords attacked him with the help of their goons. Tribal people of the area retaliated and started forcefully recapturing their lands. What followed was a rebellion, which left one police sub inspector and nine tribals dead. Within a short span of about two months, this incident acquired great visibility and tremendous support from cross sections of Communist revolutionaries belonging to the State units of the CPI(M) in West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir. Though the United Front Government of West Bengal, headed by the CPI(M) was able to contain the rebellion within 72 days using all repressive measures possible, these units had a formal meeting in November 1967, as a result of which the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) was formed in May 1968. ‘Allegiance to the armed struggle and non-participation in the elections’ were the two cardinal principles that the AICCR adopted for its operations.#

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Naxalite movement was immensely popular. There were reports of brilliant students, including from IITs, dropping out of college to join the struggle for the rights of the tribals and landless labourers. Over the years, as the principles diluted, Naxalite movement saw much of its membership waning away. Nevertheless, it has an endless supply of men and women, victims of State apathy to their condition joining its ranks, which shows that many still believe in the cause.

How to tackle Maoists
The continuing inability of the government—whether at the Centre or in the States—to counter effectively the spread of the activities of the Maoist insurgents-cum-terrorists was once again demonstrated by the temporary control established by the CPI-Maoist and its front organisation called the People's Committee Against Police Atrocities in 17 villages spread across some 300 square kilometres in the Lalgarh area in West Bengal. 


The People's Committee, with the backing or at the instigation of the Maoists exploited local anger over alleged police excesses against the tribals following an alleged Maoist attempt to kill Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee through a landmine blast in November 2008. 


What started as a protest movement against police excesses was transformed by the Maoists into a violent political movement. The hesitation of the governments of West Bengal and India to act strongly against the Maoist-instigated committee at the very beginning was apparently due to electoral considerations arising from the recently-concluded elections to the Lok Sabha. This was exploited by the Maoists. 

Although the security forces have succeeded in ejecting the Maoists and their supporters from many of the villages earlier controlled by them, the fire is burning from inside. Since Dr Manmohan Singh came to power as the Prime Minister in 2004, he and his government have been projecting the Maoists as the greatest internal security threat faced by India and calling for and promising a special strategy to counter them through coordinated action involving the Centre and States in whose territory the Maoists are active. The Congress had appointed in 2004 a special task force of the party to go into the Maoist activities in Congress-ruled Andhra Pradesh to come out with suitable recommendations for dealing with the Maoist activities.


Before evolving a strategy, however, one has to understand the basic differences between Maoist insurgency/terrorism and jihadi terrorism. Firstly, the Maoist terrorism is an almost totally rural phenomenon, whereas jihadi terrorism is a largely urban phenomenon. Secondly, Maoist terrorism is a totally indigenous phenomenon motivated by domestic grievances and a domestic political agenda.Jihadi terrorism is externally sponsored or aided by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Bangladesh and is motivated by their strategic agenda. Jihadi terrorism is a cross border threat to national security. Maoist terrorism is not. 


While the Maoist leaders are motivated largely by their desire to seek political power through a Maoist style People's War similar to the war waged by their counterparts in Nepal, their cadres and foot soldiers fighting for them are largely motivated by genuine grievances arising from the political, economic and social hardships. 


It is India’s long neglect to develop the tribal areas which has created large pockets of alienation against the government and these pockets have become the spawning ground of Maoist terrorism. The governments concerned have to take note of the genuine grievances of the tribals and deal with them in a sympathetic manner. There has to be a system for a prompt enquiry into all allegations of excess. 

Also, Maoist terrorism cannot be effectively countered without modernising and strengthening our rural policing and the rural presence of the intelligence agencies. The tribal areas, which have not yet been affected by the Maoist virus, have to be developed on a crash basis in order to prevent the spread of the virus to them. 


The capabilities of the security agencies deployed for countering Maoist activities also have to be different from those of the urban counter-terrorism agencies. The emphasis has to be on greater mobility in the rural areas and greater protection from land-mines used extensively by the Maoists. The failure to develop the road infrastructure in the rural areas has facilitated the spread of Maoist terrorism. 

Maoists mainly attack police stations, police lines, camps and arms storage depots of para-military forces in order to demoralise the security forces and capture their arms and ammunition. The repeated success of the Maoists in mounting large-scale surprise attacks on such hard targets speaks of the poor state of rural policing and intelligence set-up and the equally poor state of physical security. Unfortunately, instead of working out an appropriate strategy which will address these operational deficiencies and at the same time pay equal attention to the political handling of the problem, there is an unwise tendency to militarise the counter-Maoist insurgency management. 

Plan for Naxal-hit States: 
The Union Home Ministry has unveiled a new Rs 500-crore fully Centre-sponsored scheme which will be implemented by State governments—for Naxalism-hit States. Centre will give Rs 135-crore a year to the States under the scheme. The scheme has five important objectives: To provide mobility to the police by upgrading existing roads in inaccessible areas; to build camping grounds and helipads at strategic locations in remote areas; to strengthen police stations that have been identified as being at risk; to upgrade and strengthen approach roads to police stations and outposts where there is risk of IEDs and landmines, and to provide for critical needs, specific to the areas where holistic anti-naxal measures are being taken in a focused manner.
The States have been asked to prepare integrated action plans in the most affected districts to achieve the objectives. For this, the ministry has identified 15 action points that include preparation of a comprehensive connectivity plan for the 33 districts seriously affected by Left-wing extremism. 

Way Ahead
Naxalism is a result of the failure of governance in Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected areas. Civil governance is almost absent and the police to population ratio is very low in LWE areas. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India seeks resolution on four terms. One, basic law and order needs improvement, therefore the number of forces has been raised. The police footfall on ground has been increased three times. The government is tackling this issue head on since the last decade, as a result, the naxals are responding with large scale violence. The government proposes to deploy 120 police battalions next year and revamp the police set up. Simultaneously, general welfare schemes are paid attention to and starting from now, it would need five years to reduce the problem significantly. Second, the focus would be on development of LWE affected areas. MHA has approved road development projects worth 7300 crore and Integrated action plan for 68 districts will be provided with internet connectivity. Considering popular grievances over land ownership, policies like the Tribal Land Act are being monitored by the MHA along with the Ministry of Tribal Affairs. Policies like the Tribal Land Act and Minor Forest Produce have given land ownership to the tribals. Bamboo has been declared as an exclusive ownership of the tribals. As a result, income of inhabitants has sharply gone up. To illustrate, tribals auctioned their produce themselves, eliminating middle men and earned 30 million annually as against earlier half million. The Police, Revenue and Forest departments were exploitative departments from a point of view. Officials are unwilling to be posted in naxal affected areas and look at such postings as punishments. Thus they are not interested at all. It’s a challenge to post and retain the best officials. So far government has achieved only 30 per cent success rate in this regard. Besides, vacancies in schools and police postings remain, which is an impediment in improving civic administration in these areas. It is extremely necessary to improve basic infrastructure in these areas to sustain recruitment and postings. PISA is monitored by the MHA. However situation is improving in a way that marriages are taking place, buses are running, markets have opened, and contractors are willing to build roads in naxal affected areas. Trust in government is improving; local population has demanded presence of police troops for another five to ten years. So far, the government has recovered 4000 sq. km of area from naxal occupation. Third, efforts should be made to regain political space in the problem areas. Naxals do not desire popular tilt towards government and want to terrify people with their brutality. In 2011, out of 1100 persons killed by the naxals, 700 were tribals. In many areas affected by naxalism, political parties do not exist but it is important to put political presence. To understand the positive impact of political parties in arresting naxalism, the state of Uttar Pradesh is a classic example. LWE has not exceeded in Uttar Pradesh owing to Bahujan Samaj Party’s stronghold in villages. Similarly, in Andhra Pradesh former Chief Minister Y S Rajshekhar Reddy made efforts for political resurrection in naxal affected areas. A commonplace problem or limitation in such efforts lies in the different perceptions of naxal problem in different state governments and the limitations posed by slow movement of federal dialogue. Though political parties are realising the gravity of the issue and the need for political presence, much work needs to be done. LWE areas are mineral rich therefore we cannot afford to make any mistake. In a scenario built by the MHA, by taking control of resources, Naxals have the capabilities to cut off power supply to Delhi in three days. Government does not expect naxals to give up arms; rather give up on violence; to which naxals would never succumb as their ideology is founded on violence. They fear that people will not support them if they give up armed struggle. Naxals cannot be tamed or brought to talks unless put under pressure. It is crucial to show them that they are not at any advantage over the government. Last, the criminal justice system needs an overhaul. About 1.8 Lac offences are laid on tribals under the FRA. There is immense harassment due to procedural bureaucracy. Several cases were withdrawn and the MHA is pushing for the withdrawal of all cases with hope that the move would bring in some relief.

Thursday, 23 May 2013

DELHI PARALYZED

DELHI PARALYZED
The Armed forces and the MEA battled out the Chinese Incursion recently, which lead the Chinese to withdrew. But the common man of Delhi faced the heat of Chinese from 19 to 21 May. The 3 days Chinese Premier’s Incursion into Delhi.  Delhi was ransacked by his visit. The untimely closure of SP Marg, the main artery which connects North and South Delhi, created massive problems to the people of Delhi.

When commuters started moving to office on a Monday morning, they saw the roads closed, which lead to huge traffic jams all along Delhi. The Police has diverted the traffic through already congested Delhi roads due to Delhi Metro construction, caused Delhi to paralyse. People could not reach their places of duty on time, at places the jam increased the commutation time by about 2 hours. All roads were clogged due to untimely increase of traffic. Ambulances could be seen struck up in the jam; I only hope the patients in the ambulances are safe. Questions that comes to my mind is, was it a failure on our part to manage things? Or was it over ensuring a reason for this? If a patient dies in ambulance due to jam who would be responsible, is it the Chinese PM?

Well, There is always a learning because Delhi will always be prone to such VVIP movements, so a composite fool proof system should be made with out causing inconvenience to our own populace inorder to appease some one else. Certain steps which could have been taken up my the Law Enforcement Agencies:

 Location of stay: Instead of placing such VVIPs in the heart of the City, he could be placed towards onside, so that the effect is localised. If such facility does not exist why not create one.

Why Not a Stay in the Rashtrapathi Bhawan. A 350 room    building meant for the stay of our President, cant it house a    VVIP. The VVIP could be heli picked and dropped so that there would be no requirement for traffic diversion and blocking of roads.

Dissemination of information.  The law enforcement agencies have not done adequately in informing the people about the closure of various roads and diversions. This information dissemination system should improve.

Adequate alternate arrangements.         Due to large strength of Police on VVIP duties, hardly any policemen could be seen controlling the traffic. We could           understand the reason as it is due to the limited strength available. Hence measures should have been taken by utilizing the services of           NSS Volunteers, Scouts and Guides for management of traffic.

Lastly I would like to appreciate the efforts of the law Enforcement agencies for an Incident free conduct of the Chinese premiers Visit, even though some hardships were borne by the populace of Delhi. My only suggestion is implementation of some of the above things would bring necessary solace to the people of Delhi against the ever increasing VVIP movements.








Friday, 17 May 2013

Indian Army in Strong Hands


Indian Army in Strong Hands

Indians would welcome that a potential ugly spat with China had been averted after China pulled back its troops who had intruded across the LAC into Indian Territory in Ladakh. The intrusion tested Indian nerves for 20 days. The credit of handling the issue effectively without shedding a drop of blood goes to many but most importantly the man who holds the reins of the 1.3 Million Strong Army, General Bikram Singh the Chief of Indian Army Staff. He ensured the maintenance of pressure on China and suggested to the Government of limited action to cut off the Chinese post from rear. That did the trick and the Chinese were forced to back off.

Ever since the General took the reins of the Army, he had sent strong message to our nation’s opponents that “Nonsense would not be tolerated”. While going through a series of incidents during the past year one could easily get a feel of that. When the beheading issue took centre stage, media reported that “Chief of Army Staff General Bikram Singh announced that the army would retaliate at a date and time of its choosing for the beheading of the Indian soldier at the Line of Control (LoC) by Pakistani troops. He also termed the attack as “unpardonable” and in violation of the ethics of soldiering. Singh made it clear that he had instructed the local army commanders to retaliate if provoked and that the Pakistani ‘operations’ leading to the beheading of the Jawan would be met with a ‘tactical’ response.” This clearly states that he has given latitude and space to junior commanders to operate offensively. Later in a Conclave General lashed Pakistan on its double-standards, saying that India can't give up the strategically important Siachen. He also brought out the way Pakistan is supporting non state actors in terror against India.

The strong stature of the General was once again seen in his stance on AFSPA in the Kashmir valley. He categorically stated that when Armed forces are operating in the hinterland, certain safeguards were required for them to operate with ease. This argument was accepted by the Government.

With what ever information I got through my friends in Army, Singh has been doing a lot to the armed force, be it improvement in infrastructure, modernisation or Welfare schemes for the serving and retired. I am surprised that he was the same person whose name was maligned in the succession issue last year where he has come out clean, had he been victimized then it would have a great loss for the whole nation but as is said God is always with the truthful and deserving, and he surely deserved.

Very few Chiefs have had such a strong personality to put up their point of view with clarity to the Government and dig in their heels. Such Generals are rare and they deserve our whole hearted salute and support.

Jai Hind

Friday, 10 May 2013

One Sector One Force



One Sector One Force
1.       The recent Chinese incursion across the LAC is a matter which has been analysed by defence analysts and strategists. Many questions were thrown around were, How have they come in? Were our armed forces at the vigil? Who is responsible? When did we come to know? What was the ‘quid pro quo’? All genuine questions emerging from the need to unravel the incident and its complexities
2.       This is not the first time Chinese intruded into India, it has happened earlier also. The vast Chinese border is guarded by the ITBP, a police force under the MHA. ITBP battalions comprise 6-8 companies with over 100 constables in each company. These companies are located close to the LAC with their Head Quarters invariably well behind, sometimes hundreds of Km away. The vast distances in the chain of command at times create a command and control problems.
3.       Coming to the area in Daulat Beg Oldie or what is called SSN. The ITBP post of one of the two Battallions in that sector is at Burstse or Bush Area which was the closest to Raki Nala. The Chinese intrusion took place close to the Raki nala area. What was shocking was that ITBP came to know of the incursion after they had pitched up the tents ( I believe  helicopter reconnaissance sortie first saw the tents) . This is not a satisfactory response by a professional force. But what lead to it? Is it lack of command and control elements in close vicinity to guide and instruct? MHA which is responsible for the ITBP has not come out with any statement and pointed towards the MoD for answers on intrusion. This puts a question on who is officially responsible, is it the MoD or the MHA.
4.       In 2001 the Kargil Review Committe had, inter alia recommended that all unsettled borders should be under the MoD (Army) control. This is being followed in case of LOC in J&K where the BSF is under command Army and also in NE where the Assam Rifles is operationally under the command the Army. However, some disputed border segments with China are still under operational command of ITBP under the MHA. Why cant there be a unity of command and ITBP placed under command the Army? Is it the strong MHA lobby which is resisting the case? One should note that when ever multiple organisations handle a same issue, there is a possibility of overall ineffectiveness. One feels “One sector one Force”, should be the norm to ensure proper coordination and effective control.
5.       A special defence and security committee headed by Naresh Chandra which submitted its recommendations last year recommended the same. It emphasised that multiple organisations handling the same situation might not give the desired results. Let’s hope that the CCS meeting which is tentatively scheduled in August/September will take the right decision in this regard.