25 May 13, a black Saturday in the history of Congress
party of Chhattisgarh, The entire top party leadership was wiped out. The
party made a hue and cry, it called for a state Bandh and many leaders pledged to
put an end to the Naxal menace. 28 people killed in the deadly attack by the
Naxals at Jagdalpur, which included Congress leadership and CRPF personnel.
Who are these Maoists? Mostly these Maoist/Naxal groups
function under the umbrella organization Communist Party of India (Maoist) that
has been banned by the Home Ministry of India as the 34th terrorist
organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. These Maoists
organizations/groups have been found to be working as ‘partners’ at various
times and locations with SIMI,ULFA, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harkatul Mujahideen,
Al Badr, Jamat-ul-Mujahid and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).
The Central
Committee of the CPI (Maoist) has published a secret red book 'Strategy and
Tactics of the Indian Revolution', which is said to be the Naxals' Bible.
Talking about supporting anti-national movements the book says: “Lakhs of
enemy's armed troops have been deployed since long in J&K and the
north-eastern States. More and more nationalities may come into armed
confrontation with the reactionary Indian State, so it will be difficult for
the Indian ruling classes to mobilise all their armed forces against our
revolutionary war.”
The
‘Red Corridor’ runs through the dense forest and tribal belt, from Nepal
through Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and all the way
to Andhra Pradesh and to the upper reaches of Maharashtra, and some parts of
Karnataka. Inside their corridor, the Naxalites run a parallel government and
vow to continue their fight against the state—a full-fledged war they call
‘people’s struggle’.
All
the Left-wing militant organisations, including the Maoist Communist Centre
(MCC) and the People’s War Group (PWG), after their merger are now operating
under the flagship rebel party—CPI (Maoist).
The
Central intelligence reports have also issued a warning that the Maoists are
now in the process of identifying ‘new operational areas’ across the country.
They are keenly looking at industrial belts, where big corporate houses are
planning to set up the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), an easy target to launch
violent agitation.
The
Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist) has published a secret red book ‘Strategy
and Tactics of the Indian Revolution’, which is said to be the Naxals’ Bible.
The book says: “The central task of the revolution is seizure of political
power through protracted People’s war.” Talking about supporting sub-national
movements in India, the book says: “Lakhs of enemy’s armed troops have been
deployed since long in J&K and the north-eastern States. More and more
nationalities may come into armed confrontation with the reactionary Indian
State, so it will be difficult for the Indian ruling classes to mobilise all
their armed forces against our revolutionary war.” It further says the urban
areas are one of the main sources which provide cadre and leadership having
various types of capabilities essential for People’s war.
Birth of Naxalism
In the
backdrop of organizational upheavals within the Indian Communist movement, an
incident in a remote area transformed the history of left-wing extremism in
India. In a remote village called Naxalbari in West Bengal, a tribal youth
named Bimal Kissan, having obtained a judicial order, went to plough his land
on March 2, 1967. The local landlords attacked him with the help of their
goons. Tribal people of the area retaliated and started forcefully recapturing
their lands. What followed was a rebellion, which left one police sub inspector
and nine tribals dead. Within a short span of about two months, this incident
acquired great visibility and tremendous support from cross sections of
Communist revolutionaries belonging to the State units of the CPI(M) in West
Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and
Jammu and Kashmir. Though the United Front Government of West Bengal, headed by
the CPI(M) was able to contain the rebellion within 72 days using all
repressive measures possible, these units had a formal meeting in November
1967, as a result of which the All India Coordination Committee of Communist
Revolutionaries (AICCCR) was formed in May 1968. ‘Allegiance to the armed
struggle and non-participation in the elections’ were the two cardinal
principles that the AICCR adopted for its operations.#
In the
late 1960s and early 1970s, the Naxalite movement was immensely popular. There
were reports of brilliant students, including from IITs, dropping out of
college to join the struggle for the rights of the tribals and landless
labourers. Over the years, as the principles diluted, Naxalite movement saw
much of its membership waning away. Nevertheless, it has an endless supply of
men and women, victims of State apathy to their condition joining its ranks,
which shows that many still believe in the cause.
How to tackle
Maoists
The continuing inability of the government—whether at
the Centre or in the States—to counter effectively the spread of the activities
of the Maoist insurgents-cum-terrorists was once again demonstrated by the
temporary control established by the CPI-Maoist and its front organisation
called the People's Committee Against Police Atrocities in 17 villages spread
across some 300 square kilometres in the Lalgarh area in West Bengal.
The
People's Committee, with the backing or at the instigation of the Maoists
exploited local anger over alleged police excesses against the tribals
following an alleged Maoist attempt to kill Chief Minister Buddhadeb
Bhattacharjee through a landmine blast in November 2008.
What
started as a protest movement against police excesses was transformed by the
Maoists into a violent political movement. The hesitation of the governments of
West Bengal and India to act strongly against the Maoist-instigated committee
at the very beginning was apparently due to electoral considerations arising
from the recently-concluded elections to the Lok Sabha. This was exploited by
the Maoists.
Although
the security forces have succeeded in ejecting the Maoists and their supporters
from many of the villages earlier controlled by them, the fire is burning from
inside. Since Dr Manmohan
Singh came to power as the Prime Minister in 2004, he and his government
have been projecting the Maoists as the greatest internal security threat faced
by India and calling for and promising a special strategy to counter them
through coordinated action involving the Centre and States in whose
territory the Maoists are active. The Congress had appointed in 2004 a special
task force of the party to go into the Maoist activities in Congress-ruled
Andhra Pradesh to come out with suitable recommendations for dealing with the
Maoist activities.
Before
evolving a strategy, however, one has to understand the basic differences
between Maoist insurgency/terrorism and jihadi terrorism. Firstly, the Maoist terrorism is an
almost totally rural phenomenon, whereas jihadi terrorism is a largely urban
phenomenon. Secondly, Maoist terrorism is a totally indigenous phenomenon
motivated by domestic grievances and a domestic political agenda.Jihadi terrorism is externally sponsored or
aided by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Bangladesh and is
motivated by their strategic agenda. Jihadi terrorism is a cross border threat to national
security. Maoist terrorism is not.
While
the Maoist leaders are motivated largely by their desire to seek political
power through a Maoist style People's War similar to the war waged by their
counterparts in Nepal, their cadres and foot soldiers fighting for them are
largely motivated by genuine grievances arising from the political, economic
and social hardships.
It is
India’s long neglect to develop the tribal areas which has created large
pockets of alienation against the government and these pockets have become the
spawning ground of Maoist terrorism. The governments concerned have to take
note of the genuine grievances of the tribals and deal with them in a
sympathetic manner. There has to be a system for a prompt enquiry into all
allegations of excess.
Also,
Maoist terrorism cannot be effectively countered without modernising and
strengthening our rural policing and the rural presence of the intelligence
agencies. The tribal areas, which have not yet been affected by the Maoist
virus, have to be developed on a crash basis in order to prevent the spread of
the virus to them.
The
capabilities of the security agencies deployed for countering Maoist activities
also have to be different from those of the urban counter-terrorism agencies.
The emphasis has to be on greater mobility in the rural areas and greater
protection from land-mines used extensively by the Maoists. The failure to
develop the road infrastructure in the rural areas has facilitated the spread
of Maoist terrorism.
Maoists
mainly attack police stations, police lines, camps and arms storage depots of
para-military forces in order to demoralise the security forces and capture
their arms and ammunition. The repeated success of the Maoists in mounting
large-scale surprise attacks on such hard targets speaks of the poor state of
rural policing and intelligence set-up and the equally poor state of
physical security. Unfortunately,
instead of working out an appropriate strategy which will address these
operational deficiencies and at the same time pay equal attention to the
political handling of the problem, there is an unwise tendency to militarise
the counter-Maoist insurgency management.
Plan for Naxal-hit States: The
Union Home Ministry has unveiled a new Rs 500-crore fully Centre-sponsored
scheme which will be implemented by State governments—for Naxalism-hit States.
Centre will give Rs 135-crore a year to the States under the scheme. The scheme has five important objectives: To provide mobility to the police by upgrading existing roads
in inaccessible areas; to build camping grounds and helipads at strategic
locations in remote areas; to strengthen police stations that have been
identified as being at risk; to upgrade and strengthen approach roads to police
stations and outposts where there is risk of IEDs and landmines, and to provide
for critical needs, specific to the areas where holistic anti-naxal measures
are being taken in a focused manner.
The
States have been asked to prepare integrated action plans in the most affected
districts to achieve the objectives. For this, the ministry has identified 15
action points that include preparation of a comprehensive connectivity plan for
the 33 districts seriously affected by Left-wing extremism.
Way
Ahead
Naxalism is a result of the failure of governance in Left Wing Extremism
(LWE) affected areas. Civil governance is almost absent and the police to
population ratio is very low in LWE areas. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA),
Government of India seeks resolution on four terms. One, basic law and order needs
improvement, therefore the number of forces has been raised. The police
footfall on ground has been increased three times. The government is tackling
this issue head on since the last decade, as a result, the naxals are
responding with large scale violence. The government proposes to deploy 120
police battalions next year and revamp the police set up. Simultaneously,
general welfare schemes are paid attention to and starting from now, it would
need five years to reduce the problem significantly. Second, the focus would be
on development of LWE affected areas. MHA has approved road development projects
worth 7300 crore and Integrated action plan for 68 districts will be provided
with internet connectivity. Considering popular grievances over land ownership,
policies like the Tribal Land Act are being monitored by the MHA along with the
Ministry of Tribal Affairs. Policies like the Tribal Land Act and Minor Forest
Produce have given land ownership to the tribals. Bamboo has been declared as an
exclusive ownership of the tribals. As a result, income of inhabitants has
sharply gone up. To illustrate, tribals auctioned their produce themselves,
eliminating middle men and earned 30 million annually as against earlier half
million. The Police, Revenue and Forest departments were exploitative departments
from a point of view. Officials are unwilling to be posted in naxal affected
areas and look at such postings as punishments. Thus they are not interested at
all. It’s a challenge to post and retain the best officials. So far government
has achieved only 30 per cent success rate in this regard. Besides, vacancies
in schools and police postings remain, which is an impediment in improving
civic administration in these areas. It is extremely necessary to improve basic
infrastructure in these areas to sustain recruitment and postings. PISA is
monitored by the MHA. However situation is improving in a way that marriages
are taking place, buses are running, markets have opened, and contractors are
willing to build roads in naxal affected areas. Trust in government is improving;
local population has demanded presence of police troops for another five to ten
years. So far, the government has recovered 4000 sq. km of area from naxal
occupation. Third, efforts should be made to regain political space in the
problem areas. Naxals do not desire popular tilt towards government and want to
terrify people with their brutality. In 2011, out of 1100 persons killed by the
naxals, 700 were tribals. In many areas affected by naxalism, political parties
do not exist but it is important to put political presence. To understand the
positive impact of political parties in arresting naxalism, the state of Uttar
Pradesh is a classic example. LWE has not exceeded in Uttar Pradesh owing to
Bahujan Samaj Party’s stronghold in villages. Similarly, in Andhra Pradesh
former Chief Minister Y S Rajshekhar Reddy made efforts for political
resurrection in naxal affected areas. A commonplace problem or limitation in
such efforts lies in the different perceptions of naxal problem in different
state governments and the limitations posed by slow movement of federal
dialogue. Though political parties are realising the gravity of the issue and
the need for political presence, much work needs to be done. LWE areas are
mineral rich therefore we cannot afford to make any mistake. In a scenario
built by the MHA, by taking control of resources, Naxals have the capabilities
to cut off power supply to Delhi in three days. Government does not expect
naxals to give up arms; rather give up on violence; to which naxals would never
succumb as their ideology is founded on violence. They fear that people will
not support them if they give up armed struggle. Naxals cannot be tamed or brought
to talks unless put under pressure. It is crucial to show them that they are
not at any advantage over the government. Last, the criminal justice system
needs an overhaul. About 1.8 Lac offences are laid on tribals under the FRA.
There is immense harassment due to procedural bureaucracy. Several cases were
withdrawn and the MHA is pushing for the withdrawal of all cases with hope that
the move would bring in some relief.